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Securities
By William S. Jacobs*

I. INTRODUCTION
The Fifth Circuit's 1980 securities laws decisions contained valuable instruction on a variety of issues, although none are likely to become
landmarks. Because a number of the cases deal with subjects that are
pertinent to both the Securities Act of 1933' (the 1933 Act) and the Securities Exchange Act of 19342 (the 1934 Act), this survey will be organized by topic rather than statute.

II. THE DEFINTION OF A "SEcuRrrY"
The "What is a security?" issue is the principal focus of almost onequarter of the Circuit's 1980 securities cases. Perhaps this is a tribute to
both the attractions of a federal forum and federal securities law causes
of action for dealing with commercial disputes. It is also surely a tribute
to the difficulties inherent in the prevailing definition of the term "investment contract" as it appears in the definition of a "security" in both the
1933 and 1934 Acts.3
Each of the Fifth Circuit's five "What is a security?" cases have applied
the test set forth in SEC v. W.J. Howey Co." Under that test, an "investment contract" is:
"[A] contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person invests his money
in [1] a common enterprise and is led to [2] expect profits [3] solely from
the efforts of the promoter or a third party, it being immaterial whether
the shares in the enterprise are evidenced by formal certificates or by
Partner in the firm of Trotter, Bondurant, Miller & Hishon, Atlanta, Georgia.
Swarthmore College (B.A. 1967); St. John's College, Cambridge, England; Duke University
(J.D. 1973). Member of the State Bar of Georgia and American Bar Association.
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1976 & Supp. 11 1979).
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1976 & Supp. 111 1979).
3. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1976); 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1976).
4. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
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nominal interests in the physical assets employed in the enterprise."
In two cases the Fifth Circuit concluded that a security was or might be
present. The most significant of these is Williamson v. Tucker,6 which
will probably generate additional litigation among general partners, joint
venturers, and tenants in common over whether their relationships have
involved securities. The case arose from the sale by a promoter of joint
venture interests in undeveloped property. In connection with the sales,
the promoter touted its management expertise, and advertised that it
would aggressively pursue zoning and land planning efforts in order "to
assure the maximum profit potential of each investment. '7 The joint venture documentation, however, did reserve various matters for unanimous
determination by the joint venturers. Among these matters were decisions
to borrow money or to pledge the joint venture property-powers which
would give each joint venturer a veto over development plans.
Under the Howey test, the security status of the joint venture interests
turns on whether they involve an expectation of profits to be derived
"solely" from the efforts of others. As also observed earlier during the
year in Martin v. T. V. Tempo, Inc.,O discussed below, the word "solely" is
not applied in its most literal sense. With this in mind, the court set out
three instances in which general partnership or joint venture interests
could be treated as securities even though the investors/partners retained
some degree of control and participation. These three instances are: (1)
when there is such a limited distribution of power to the partners that
the arrangement is tantamount to a limited partnership; (2) when the investors/partners are so inexperienced and unknowledgeable in business
affairs that they are not capable of intelligently exercising their partnership or venture powers; and (3) when the promoter provides a unique
entrepreneurial or managerial ability that as a practical matter precludes
the investors/partners from either replacing the - promoter or otherwise
exercising meaningful partnership or venture powers.'
In Williamson, the investors/partners were sophisticated businessmen,
and meaningful powers were reserved for them under the joint venture
agreement. For these reasons the Fifth Circuit questioned whether the
investors would be able to bring their situation within its test for a security. However, the case was remanded to provide them with an opportunity to introduce evidence as to their dependency on the promoter.

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Id. at 298-99.
632 F.2d 579 (5th Cir. 1980).
Id. at 583.
628 F.2d 887 (5th Cir. 1980), discussed at notes 21-26 and accompanying text infra.
632 F.2d at 599.
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Cameron v. Outdoor Resorts of America, Inc.' is the other case in
which security status was not rejected. It involved the sale to two purchasers of twenty and twenty-five lots in condominium campsite blocks.
It was clear from the sales representations, as well as the quantity of lots
purchased, that the purchases were not motivated by a desire to "use or
consume the item purchased."" Moreover, the three Howey tests were
readily met. A common enterprise was present because the rental success
of the particular lots depended on the success of the entire development,
even though rentals would be received only as particular campsites were
selected by campers. The expectation of profits from rental arrangements,
by which the owner of each lot would receive one-half of all rental receipts attributable to that particular lot, was clear, and no material effort
on the part of the investors was expected or required-indeed they were
prohibited from renting out their own lots.
Cameron explored several other issues of interest to this survey, including the scienter requirement for rule 10b-5' liability. The misrepresentations concerned the prospects for rental income in the near future. The
district court concluded that the evidence established that the defendants
knew, or in the exercise of slight care should have known, that the corporation's officers did not in fact expect such rental income. Interestingly,
the Fifth Circuit concluded that this was not a sufficient finding of scienter, apparently equating the failure to exercise "slight care" with simple
negligence.
Cameron also involved a question of controlling persons liability under
section 20(a) of the 1934 Act, which imposes liability on controlling persons unless they "acted in good faith" and "did not directly or indirectly
induce the act or acts constituting the violation."' 8 The misrepresentations had been made by salesmen, and the Fifth Circuit initially affirmed
the district court's conclusion that the on-site executive officer had failed
to establish and diligently enforce a proper system of supervision and
control, and should be held liable, but that the off-site chairman of the
board, who did not have effective day-to-day control and knowledge, was
not liable. However, on petition for rehearing, 1 the Fifth Circuit realized
that the salesmen had not been held liable under rule 10b-5 because of
the district court's improper handling of the scienter issue. Because statutory controlling persons liability could not attach to the president for the
common law fraud violation, his liability as a controlling person would
10. 608 F.2d 187 (5th Cir. 1979), modified on rehearing, 611 F.2d 105 (1980). See text
accompanying note 14 infra.
11. United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852-53 (1975).
12. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1980). See notes 77-82 and accompanying text infra.
13. 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (1976).

14. 611 F.2d 105 (1980).
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require determination on remand of whether the misrepresentations had
been made with the scienter necessary to establish a primary rule 10b-5
violation. 1'
Finally, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's conclusion that
the assignee of the purchaser's notes and security documents could enforce those instruments. Under section 29(b) of the 1934 Act,16 these documents would have been void as to the assignee if it had acquired them
with "actual knowledge" of the facts establishing the statutory violation.
In this case, the evidence supported the conclusion that the assignee had
no such knowledge. It was helpful that the assignee had conducted an
investigation of the defendants and their sales methods, including having
an employee pose as a prospective purchaser.
Of the arrangements held not to involve a security, the most common
17
alleged "security" was presented in United American Bank v. Gunter,
which involved a participation purchased by the plaintiff bank in a loan
made by another bank. In this case the Fifth Circuit issued a one paragraph per curiam opinion affirming the district court decision for the reasons stated therein, and attached that decision as an appendix. The district court had relied on the "commercial-investment dichotomy" for
determining whether a note is subject to the federal securities laws.'8 Applying this concept, it had little difficulty in determining that the transaction was of an ordinary commercial nature and thus did not involve a
security despite the literal language of the 1934 Act, which defines a security to include "any note . . . certificate of interest or participation"

therein." In reaching its conclusion, the district court applied the Howey
test, and continued the practice of arguing in these commercial banking
cases that a fixed rate of return was suggestive of non-security status because it eliminated the "reasonable expectation of profits" referred to in
20

Howey.

Martin v. T.V. Tempo, Inc.'" presents the "What is a security?" ques15. "Controlling persons" liability is further discussed at text accompanying notes 80-81
infra.

16. 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(b) (1976).
17. 620 F.2d 1108 (5th Cir. 1980).
18. See, e.g., National Bank of Commerce v. All American Assurance Co., 583 F.2d 1295
(5th Cir. 1978); Woodward v. Metro Bank, 522 F.2d 84, 92 (5th Cir. 1975); McClure v. First
Nat'l Bank, 497 F.2d 490, 495 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 930 (1975); Bellah v.
First Natl Bank, 495 F.2d 1109 (5th Cir. 1974).
19. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1976).

20. The conceptual flaws in the Fifth Circuit's approach to note transactions has been
examined recently in an article that would be helpful to any practitioner confronted with a
note-as-a security case: Sonnenschein, Federal Securities Law Converage of Note Transactions: The Antifraud Provisions, 35 Bus. LAw 1567 (July, 1980).
21. 628 F.2d 887 (5th Cir. 1980).
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tion in the context of a publishing franchise. The franchise granted the
exclusive right to distribute T.V. Tempo magazines in specified areas.
The magazine would be provided by the franchisor, but the franchisee
depended for its profit upon its ability to generate gross advertising revenues in excess of the cost of publishing and distribution. In affirming the
district court's determination that no security was involved, the court reviewed the Howey test, and applied the Fifth Circuit's reformulation of
the "solely from the efforts of others" aspect of that test. As stated in
SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc.,"2 this requirement has been interpreted to depend on "whether the efforts made by those other than the
investor are the undeniably significant ones, those essential managerial
efforts which affect the failure or success of the enterprise."2 The defendants in T.V. Tempo were doomed by their own testimony that a T.V.
Tempo franchise might be good for an "owner-operator," but that it
would be foolish for an "investor," and that the only way for a franchise
to be successful was for the franchisee to devote "a lot of long, hard
hours.""' The Fifth Circuit also noted testimony to the effect that a local
franchise could survive even if the franchisor went out of business.
The T.V. Tempo plaintiff sought to apply the "risk capital" test. The
court refused, noting that the Fifth Circuit had not previously embraced
that test,2 5 and also stating that the evidence was not sufficient to support
a finding of a security even if the test were applied. Finally, the Fifth
Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal with prejudice of a pendant
state securities law claim, thus permitting the plaintiffs to argue in state
court that the franchises were securities for the purposes of the Georgia
Securities Act.26
In Westchester Corp. v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.,"7 the alleged
"investment contract" was a sales contract providing for deferred transfer
of title to real estate. The seller owned tracts of land on which it would
do the initial development work necessary for a residential community.
As the lots were readied for further construction, they would be transferred in phases on a scheduled basis to the purchaser. The seller incurred substantial expenses, and the purchaser defaulted on its obligation
to pay for certain of the lots. The seller thereupon obtained a state court
judgment on its contract against the purchaser, but failed to recover all of
its damages, at least in part because the seller had become financially
distressed. Thus, the purchaser sought to make itself whole by a suit

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

497 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1974).
Id. at 483.
628 F.2d at 890.
See SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d at 482 n.13.
GA. CODE ANN. §§ 97-101-9901 (1976 & Supp. 1980).
626 F.2d 1212 (5th Cir. 1980).
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against the accountants who had prepared financial statements on which
the seller had relied in determining the purchaser's financial capacity to
honor the contract.
The district court granted summary judgment for the defendant on all
counts, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed. On the securities law issue, it held
that the contract was for the sale of real property, and did not constitute
an investment contract under the test of Howey. The court rejected the
seller's contention that the commitment to make future payments in connection with the future sales was a note, and stated that, even if it was a
note, it would not be a security for statutory purposes because it was
merely reflective of an individual commercial transaction.
Although the court did not refer to the problem, it seems evident that
had the court treated this contract as a security, it would have been hard
pressed to avoid bringing within the ambit of the securities laws any
agreements involving future payments for future provision of goods or
services.
III. SALES AID SELLERS

Several 1980 Fifth Circuit cases explored the questions of whether a
transaction involved a "sale" for federal securities laws purposes, or
whether a particular participant was in fact a "seller" for purposes of either statutory liability or standing to sue for recovery. The most significant of these cases, both for the issue posed and the context in which it
arises, is Croy v. Campbell."8 This was a suit by a client asserting securities law liability against his attorney, who had provided tax advice and
other assistance in connection with the purchase of a real estate limited
partnership interest.
In Croy, the defendant-attorney had introduced the purchasers to the
seller, and in fact had been paid his fee by the seller rather than by the
purchasers, who were technically his clients. The attorney had performed
tax analyses of the investment based upon the information provided by
the seller, and apparently had recommended the investment for its
favorable tax benefits. The plaintiff sued for violation of section 12(2) of
the 1933 Act,' which prohibits material misstatements or omissions by
one who offers or sells a security, and rule 10b-5.30 The district court concluded that the attorney was not "a seller" for purposes of section 12(2),
and that he had made no material misstatements or omissions.
In resolving the issue of whether the attorney was a "seller," the district court applied the "proximate cause" test announced in Hill York
28.
29.
30.

624 F.2d 709 (5th Cir. 1980).
15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1976).
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1980).
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Corp. v. American InternationalFranchise,Inc.3 1 Thus, the question was
not merely participation in the sale, but whether the defendant "caused"
the transaction to take place. The district court made various findings of
fact tending to reduce the significance of his importance in the sale. For
example, the attorney had made no representations with respect to the
operational aspects of the project, had not prepared the offering circular,
did not attempt to persuade the plaintiffs to make the purchase, and had
focused primarily on anticipated tax benefits. Additionally, the plaintiffs
had viewed the project and had consulted both the seller and independent advisors. Finding that these conclusions were not clearly erroneous,
the Fifth Circuit stated:
[W]e cannot say that the defendant's participation ...

proximately

caused the plaintiff's injury, or that they would not have purchased the
security 'but for' his actions. The injury was caused by the fact that the
figures used by [the defendant] in arriving at the depreciable basis were
in error. Plaintiffs contend that he should be held liable for his failure to
investigate these matters thoroughly. This failure to investigate, however,
was not a substantial factor in the Croys' investment decision, and
Campbell cannot, therefore, be held liable under section 12(2) as a seller
of the security.42
The Fifth Circuit cautioned that the case should not be interpreted to
mean that a lawyer participating in a transaction can never be treated as
a seller for section 12 purposes. "Each case naturally turns upon its own
facts, and our decision in this case is based upon the facts as found by the
district court." 33 It might also be noted that the standards used seem to
defy meaningful articulation, and that they present the opportunity for
wide variations in the results of particular cases. Nonetheless, any attorney involved in advising clients on their investments should carefully
study this case for its insights into the types of factors that may prove
important.
As for the rule 10b-5 action, the district court had found that the attorney had not made any material misrepresentations or omissions, and that
he could not have discovered the existence of such misrepresentations or
omissions through the exercise of reasonable care. While he had used erroneous figures in making his tax analysis, the Fifth Circuit did not believe that use of this information, which had been supplied to him, rose to
the level of recklessness.
In an interesting footnote, the Fifth Circuit addressed the issue of the
fee being paid by the seller of the property and the fact that its payment
31. 448 F.2d 680, 693 (5th Cir. 1971).
32. 624 F.2d at 714.
33. Id.
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was contingent upon sale of the limited partnership interest.8 4 The court
emphasized that the matter was presented in a securities action, not a
case concerning attorney malpractice. Recovery under rule 10b-5 was precluded by the district court's finding that the fee arrangement had been
disclosed to the plaintiffs.80
The other cases involving the sales/seller question present rule 10b-5
claims that are confronted with the defense that the plaintiff is not a
purchaser or seller of securities as required by Blue Chip Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores.8 In each instance the Fifth Circuit concluded that
the plaintiff was a seller and did have standing to maintain his rule 10b-5
action.
Alley v. Miramon 7 is a state breach-of-fiduciary-duty case that managed to sneak into federal court through a generous application of the
forced seller doctrine. The district court's findings of fact, which were not
disturbed on appeal, were that Alley had delivered shares in a corporation
to its controlling shareholder, Miramon, for the purpose of having them
pledged to secure a loan to the corporation. The loan was never made and
the shares were never pledged, but the certificate was cancelled and a
replacement issued in the name of Miramon. Thereafter, the corporation
was liquidated without notice to Alley, and Miramon pocketed the entire
proceeds. Struggling to stay in federal court (a state court action had
been abandoned for reasons not explained in the reported federal case),
Alley asserted that both the liquidation and the transfer to Miramon for
the purpose of pledge were sales. The Fifth Circuit rejected the second
contention, on the obvious basis that neither a pledge nor a foreclosure
occurred, as required by prior Fifth Circuit cases;3 8 Alley had merely delivered his shares, endorsed in blank, to Miramon as his agent for the
limited purpose of making the pledge which never occurred.
However, Alley was successful on the first contention, that the liquidation and conversion of his shares to a claim for cash constituted a "forced
sale." The Fifth Circuit based its decision on the Second Circuit's decision in Vine v. Beneficial Finance Co.,"9 in which a fraudulently accomplished merger resulted in the plaintiff having no option but to exchange
his share certificates for cash. Based on this theory, which, according to
the court, survived Blue Chip Stamps, the court concluded that Alley
had standing to sue. The Fifth Circuit then stated that the fraudulent

34. Id. at 716 n.7.
35. Cf. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 476 (1977).
36. 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
37. 614 F.2d 1372 (5th Cir. 1980).
38. See McClure v. First Nat'l Bank, 497 F.2d 490 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S.
930 (1975).
39. 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967).
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acts (presumably Miramon's misrepresentations to Alley concerning the
purpose of his acquiring the share certificate) had a "sufficient nexus"
with the liquidation to meet the "in connection with" requirement of rule
10b-5. Earlier in the opinion, the court had made clear that it would apply this element of rule 10b-5 flexibly and broadly.' 0 The Fifth Circuit
gave no consideration to the Supreme Court's efforts to prevent rule 10b5 from becoming an all-purpose
substitute for state fraud and fiduciary
41
duty causes of action.
Alley also presents the now rather unusual defense that the transaction
did not involve instrumentalities of interstate commerce or the mails. Relying on two intrastate phone calls and one letter, written by another
party but upon the encouragement of Miramon, as well as on the use of
the mails to deliver to the Louisiana Secretary of State documents relating to dissolution of the corporation, the court easily disposed of this
contention.
In Falls v. Fickling,'4 the Fifth Circuit held that the sale of stock to
satisfy the obligations of a judgment debtor does constitute a sale by the
debtor. The court reasoned that, while plainly a forced seller, the debtor
is nonetheless the party from whom title passes, and for whose benefit the
proceeds are collected. The fact that the debtor is powerless to prevent
the sale was viewed as being pertinent not to the question of whether he
was a seller, but rather to whether there was a sufficient causal nexus
between the alleged wrongful conduct and the debtor's loss.
The judgment debtor alleged that the parties holding the judgment
were insiders of the corporation whose stock would be sold, and that they
were aware of allegedly material non-public information affecting the
value of the stock. They had acquired the stock at the judgment sale at
approximately its then market value. The judgment debtor sued for the
subsequent increase in market value.
The judgment creditors relied primarily on St. Louis Union Trust Co.
v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,4 1 which involved the acquisition by Merrill Lynch of certain of its stock from a former partner
shortly before a public offering of its shares. In that case the sale was
pursuant to an option previously granted by the former partner, under
which his estate had no choice as to whether to sell or at what price. The
Fifth Circuit distinguished this case on the grounds that while the judgment debtor could not have stopped the sale, he could have affected the
price by bidding in had he been aware of alleged material information.
Indeed, he allegedly was present at the sale with sufficient funds to ac40.
41.
42.
43.

614 F.2d
See, e.g.,
621 F.2d
562 F.2d

at 1378 n.11.
Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
1362 (5th Cir. 1980).
1040 (8th Cir. 1977).
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quire the stock, if necessary, to assure that the sale was at least at market
value. On this basis, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal and remanded for trial.
Broad v. Rockwell InternationalCorp." also discussed the purchaserseller issue. In this case, which is discussed more fully below, the court
concluded that a merger and resulting amendment of a trust indenture
did not result in a forced sale of the securities issued under the original
indenture by a party to the merger.

IV.

1933 AcT EXEMPTIONS AND REGISTRATION

The three cases dealing with the 1933 Act exemptions and registration
requirements probably constitute the most significant group of securities
law decisions during the year. Two of the three also contain, at least in
this observer's view, serious conceptual flaws.
Swenson v. Engelstad5 teaches us once again that the section 4(2) statutory private placement exemption 4 is an exceedingly treacherous exemption in the Fifth Circuit. Those practitioners who were not convinced
by Judge Goldberg's lyrical extolling of the virtues of rule 146'" in Doran
v.Petroleum Management Corp.48 should also read Swenson prior to relying on the statutory exemption for a sale of securities to anyone other
than a clear corporate insider or institutional investor. In Swenson, the
coach of the Amarillo Wranglers, a Southwest Hockey League franchise,
purchased the bulk of the outstanding shares of the franchise, at a price
of $116,000. Because of the jury's finding that he had failed to exercise
due diligence in the purchase, the defendant coach was unable to rely on
the antifraud provisions. Thus the matter reached the Fifth Circuit as a
pure registration exemption case. For the most part, the court applied
established learning in holding that the exemption is an affirmative defense that must be proven by the defendant, that its requirements must
be met with respect to each offeree, and that the defendant's knowledge
that the purchaser intended to distribute the securities further (in this
case, by way of the sale of options to purchase the securities) would
broaden the pool of offerees to include the purchaser's distributees. This
application of the law was sufficient to dispose of the case.
Nonetheless, the court went further, stating that the evidence failed to
establish that the purchasers either were provided or had access to "the

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

614 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1980). See text accompanying notes 110-114 infra.
626 F.2d 421 (5th Cir. 1980).
15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1976).
17 C.F.R. § 230.146 (1980).
545 F.2d 893, 908 (5th Cir. 1977).
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information that a registration statement would have contained."' Although the purchasers had had access to the corporation's books, it was
fatal that the evidence did not establish "that these books contained all
the information that Schedule A of the 1933 Act. . . would have required
a registration statement to contain." 50 The court did not cite any authority for the proposition that this failure is fatal to the private offering exemption. Presumably, however, it was referring to similar language in Doran 1 and Hill York Corp. v. American InternationalFranchises, Inc.2
This language ultimately derives from the statement in SEC v. Ralston
Purina Co.,5 3 in which the offerees "were not shown to have access to the
kind of information which registration would disclose."'" Unfortunately,
the Fifth Circuit failed to acknowledge that there is potentially a very
large difference between the "kind" of information provided by registration, and "all the information" specified in schedule A. 65
A particularly pertinent example of this distinction would be financial
statements. Schedule A requires three years of certified income statements, whereas for many small businesses financial information of a kind
thoroughly adequate for investment decision could be provided by less
elaborate unaudited statements. Rule 146, which the Securities Exchange
Commission (SEC) promulgated in an effort to add a measure of certainty to the private placement exemption, recognizes this distinction. Its
information requirement 6 requires the same "kind" of information that
is specified in schedule A, and goes on to provide for the omission of details, the condensation of information, and the omission of audited
financial statements if they cannot be obtained without unreasonable effort or expense. In addition, rule 146 expressly provides for the less exhaustive disclosure required under the regulation A exemption57 for offerings not exceeding $1,500,000.
Swenson's overly-broad language concerning the statutory privateplacement information requirement is reminiscent of the Fifth Circuit's
performance in SEC v. Continental Tobacco Co.,568 which appeared to
hold that the statutory private placement exemption was available only
for offerings to corporate insiders. This anomaly was eliminated in Doran,
the decision suggesting that the Continental Tobacco court had not really
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

626 F.2d at 427.
Id.
545 F.2d at 902-03.
448 F.2d 680, 689 (5th Cir. 1971).
346 U.S. 119 (1953).
Id. at 127 (emphasis added).
15 U.S.C. § 77aa (1976).
17 C.F.R. § 230.146(e) (1980).
17 C.F.R. §§ 230.25-230.264 (1980).
453 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1972).
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said what it had been widely interpreted to say. It is hoped that the Fifth
Circuit will soon have occasion to provide similar clarification of language
that can easily be viewed as dictum in Swenson. In the meantime, prudent practitioners will explore actively the availability of rule 146 and the
more recent expansions of private and limited offering exemptions."
Swenson is also interesting for its quite correct rejection of the proposition that the person parting with title to securities was not a seller, for
statutory liability purposes, because some other party might be a "proximate cause" of the sale. As pointed out by the court, the proximate cause
test was introduced in the Fifth Circuit in Hill York Corp.,60 in the context of expanding the class of statutory sellers to include persons who
were not technically sellers but who nonetheless had substantial roles in
the sale.
Rasmussen v. Thomson & McKinnon Auchincloss Kohlmeyer, Inc." is
of significance because of the growth of commodities trading as a public
investment vehicle. However, it is a per curiam decision that ostensibly
stands for several points that probably would not hold up under more
elaborate treatment. The plaintiff entered into a discretionary commodities trading account with an individual defendant and several related defendant companies. The agreement provided that the defendant would be
entitled to the net profits realized at the close-out of each trade. Because
the compensation was based on the results of each trade, and not on the
overall performance of the account, the plaintiff was required to pay
$13,000 in fees even though the account experienced a net loss. The plaintiff sued on a variety of grounds, including the sale of an unregistered
security in violation of section 5 of the 1933 Act."'
Without so much as a nod to growing authority in other circuits that
discretionary commodities trading accounts do not constitute securities,68
the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's holding that the account
was a security for 1933 Act purposes. The district court, however, had
also held that there had been no public offering, and thus the sale had
been exempt under the private offering exemption. This holding was also
affirmed, but with the caveat that there was no need to hold that the
59. See, e.g., R. 242, 17 C.F.I § 230.242 (1980), available for certain offerings by corporate issues, and the recent amendment to § 4 of the 1933 Act by the Small Business Issuers'
Simplification Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-477, 94 Stat. 2275, 2294 (to be codified at 15
U.S.C. § 77c(b)), which allows offerings up to five million dollars to certain institutional
investors.
60. 448 F.2d at 693. See also text accompanying notes 31-32 supra.
61. 608 F.2d 175 (5th Cir. 1979).
62. 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1976).
63. Curran v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 622 F.2d 216 (6th Cir. 1980);
Milnarik v. M-S Commodities, Inc., 457 F.2d 274 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 887
(1972).
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offering of such contracts might never constitute a public offering. In affirming the district court's basic holding, the Fifth Circuit stated that
"there was no showing in this case that the particular contract was a part
of a 'public offering,' and that therefore the trial court correctly disposed
of this claim."" On its face, this statement disregards the normal rule
that the party asserting an exemption from registration must bear the
burden of proof and, in the case of a statutory private placement exemption, would normally be unable to claim the exemption unless that party
could affirmatively establish that it had made offers only to a limited
number of qualified investors. As stated in Swenson v. Engelstad,68 a case
in which the private placement exemption issue was handled in a distinctly different manner, "the so-called private offering exemption is an
affirmative defense which must be raised and proved by the defendant.""
Interestingly, although the plaintiff in Rasmussen did make a common
law fraud claim, he did not assert liability under rule 10b-5 for the omission to disclose the material fact that fees could be due even if the overall
account was operated at a loss.
In SEC v. Southwest Coal & Energy Co., 6 7 the exemption from registration at issue was regulation B," a specialized provision for undivided
interests in oil and gas leases promulgated under section 3(b) of the 1933
Act." This exemption is similar to the regulation A exemption,"0 in that
they both require a filing of certain information with the SEC and distribution of certain information to offerees. Although SEC staff processing
and review is normal, and prudent offerors would not commence their
offering prior to receipt of comments, regardless of the apparent ability to
do so on the eleventh day after filing,71 there is no registration statement
to be declared effective, and section 11 liabilities under the 1933 Act do
7
not attach. 2
In Southwest Coal, the offering sheets filed by the company were misleading in their failure to disclose certain conflicts of interest and the related status of certain other entities. In addition, after certain of their
offerings had commenced, the principals of Southwest were subjected to
state court injunctions, an event that automatically rendered regulation B
unavailable to Southwest. The SEC alleged registration violations on two

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

608 F.2d at 178.
626 F.2d 421 (5th Cir. 1980), discussed at text accompanying notes 45-60 supra.
626 F.2d at 425.
624 F.2d 1312 (5th Cir. 1980).
17 C.F.R. §§ ?30.300-230.346 (1980).
15 U.S.C. § 77c (1976).
17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251-230.263 (1980).
See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.255, 230.310 (1980).
15 U.S.C. § 77k (1976).
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bases. The first was that sales after the state court injunctions were entered, but prior to formal suspension of the exemption, could not rely on
the regulation B exemption because those exemptions were automatically
dissolved by virtue of the entry of the injunctions. The Fifth Circuit held
that, while the injunctions did render regulation B unavailable as to any
future offerings, the structure of the statute and regulation were such
that exemptions already in effect
would not be dissolved prior to formal
78
suspension action by the SEC.

The SEC's second basis for an alleged registration violation was that
the misleading nature of the offering sheet prevented the exemption from
ever having been established, since the filing and dissemination of adequate information was a condition to reliance on the exemption. The
court quite correctly observed that this theory would serve to create a per
se registration violation out of events that traditionally were tested under
the fraud provisions with their accompanying due diligence defenses.7 '
The court concluded that this result was inconsistent with the statutory
structure, and relegated the SEC's disclosure allegations to consideration
under the 1933 Act's antifraud provisions.75 The court's rationale reached
beyond the regulation B context, and the holding will thus be of interest
to practitioners relying on other exemptions, particularly various of the
private placement exemptions that require delivery of or access to certain
76
information as a condition of exemption.
V.

FRiuD AND RELATED MATTERS

Paul F. Newton & Co. v. Texas Commerce Bank77 is a significant decision on an issue that will probably be settled at some point by the Supreme Court. The case explores the issue of common law respondeat superior liability for security law violations. It arose from a brokerage
company employee's participation in a price rigging scheme. The plaintiff
held a large amount of the stock at the time the artificially inflated price
collapsed. The district court had granted a directed verdict to the defendant on the ground that the controlling persons provision of the 1934
73. 624 F.2d at 1317.
74. Compare sections 11 and 12(2) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k and 771(2) (1976),
with § 10(b) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976), and § 17 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. §
77q (1976).
75. The Fifth Circuit applied the Supreme Court's rule in Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680,
695-700 (1980), (the SEC must prove scienter for section 17(a)(1) violations, but need not
prove scienter to establish a section 17(a)(2) violation.) Accordingly, the district court's
granting of an injunction based on the section 17(a)(2) claim was affirmed.
76. See, e.g., R. 146, 17 C.F.R. § 230.146 (1980), and rule 242, 17 C.F.R. § 230.242 (1980).
77. 630 F.2d 1111 (5th Cir. 1980).
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Act 78 was the exclusive source of liability for violations of agents and employees. The Fifth Circuit surveyed the legislative history and the conflicting authority in other circuits. It concluded that the controlling persons section of the 1934 Act had been enacted to expand secondary
liability to include persons who, by virtue of intermediary dummy entities, would have been outside the ambit of conventional respondeatsuperior liability. It thus concluded that respondeat superior liability was
available for securities law violations, a position which has been adopted
by the Second, Fourth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits, but rejected by the
Third and Ninth Circuits. In reaching its conclusion, the court was impressed by the general importance of agency principles in many areas of
the law, by the proposition that brokerage firms place their employees in
a position to injure investors, and by the protections inherent in the standard agency principles that respondeat superiorliability attaches only if
the agent acts within the course and scope of his employment and within
his actual or apparent authority."
This doctrine is likely to receive substantial attention in the coming
years. Secondary liability has become more important to plaintiffs as a
result of the scienter requirement for rule 10b-5 liability. Direct liability
cannot attach as a result of an employer's mere negligent participation in
fraudulent activities. Further, the elements of respondeat superiorliability will frequently be more readily established than those of aiding-andabetting, which normally require some degree of knowing assistance, or
statutory controlling persons liability, which is subject to a good faith
defense.
Paul F. Newton also deals with two other matters of significance to this
survey. The first concerns the standards for statutory controlling persons
liability under section 20(a) of the 1934 Act."0 The district court had
granted a directed verdict for the defendant on this issue, based on its
finding that the defendant had neither participated in nor had knowledge
of its employees' fraudulent activity. The Fifth Circuit granted a new
trial on the ground that the good faith defense of section 20(a) required
more than an absence of knowledge; rather, it required proof that the
controlling person has established, maintained and diligently enforced a
proper system of supervision and control.8"
Finally, the Fifth Circuit reiterated its position in Dupuy v. Dupuy,1a
that the standard of care to which a plaintiff is held, as a matter of establishing its rule 10b-5 case, is one of not having acted recklessly. Thus, a
78.

15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (1976).

79.
80.
81.
82.

630 F.2d at 115-19.
15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (1976).
630 F.2d at 1120.
551 F.2d 1005 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 911 (1977).
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mere negligent failure to discover or protect against the fraud is not sufficient to defeat recovery.
Shores v. Sklar" was a rule 10b-5 reliance/causation case of some importance. In Shores the plaintiff sued under rule 10b-5 on behalf of himself and all purchasers of an issue of industrial revenue bonds that had
become worthless. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure
to state a claim, because the plaintiff did not allege that he had relied on
the offering circular. Indeed, it was clear that he had not read the offering
circular. The Fifth Circuit reversed and, in explaining that the real question is whether the alleged misrepresentations and nondisclosures caused
the loss, stated, "Reliance is essential only if it plays a part in causation." 84 The Fifth Circuit read the complaint to allege much more than
misrepresentations or nondisclosures that, if known to the plaintiff, would
have influenced his willingness to purchase or to pay a particular price.
Rather, the alleged misrepresentations and nondisclosures were such that
full and accurate disclosure would have made it impossible to market the
bonds at all. This theory is similar to the fraud-on-the-market approach
that has developed in open-market price rigging cases. 85 The district
court believed that these cases required an established market in the security. The Fifth Circuit concluded that in the context of the particular
offering, such a market was- irrelevant. If proper disclosure had been
made, actions that most certainly would have been taken by other parties
in the normal course of their activities would have made it impossible to
market the bonds and thus for the plaintiff to have suffered his loss; for
this reason, adequate causation had been shown.
Pharo v. Smith" is the year's best example of a case that should never
have been litigated, that should not have absorbed nineteen pages of the
Federal Reporter, and that should result in someone, other than the defendants and the taxpayers, bearing the expenses of borderline contentions apparently asserted in an effort to reach a deep pocket. The district
court granted summary judgment without entering findings of fact or
conclusions of law, and the treatment in this survey will seek to be similarly brief.
The case arose from defendant Deltec's settlement of a contractual dispute with another defendant, Smith, who controlled the issuer and who
was making various sales of the issuer's securities, allegedly in violation of
the fraud and registration provisions. Under the terms of the settlement,
Deltec acquired 100,000 shares (less than 10% of the amount outstanding), and Smith was obligated to repurchase the shares at five dollars
83.
84.
85.
86.

610 F.2d 235 (5th Cir. 1980).
Id. at 239.
See, e.g., Zweig v. Hearst Corp., 594 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir. 1979).
621 F.2d 656 (5th Cir. 1980).
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each over a one-year period. The settlement documentation and the share
certificates contained appropriate restrictions on resale, including a prohibition on any resale by Smith of the shares repurchased from Deltec.
Based on these circumstances, the plaintiffs contended that Deltec was a
"seller" of securities for the purposes of sections 12(1) and 12(2) of the
1933 Act,87 that Deltec was an aider and abettor of section 12 violations,
that it was a "controlling" party of Smith and thus the issuer, that Deltec
was an underwriter, that it had violated or conspired to violate rule 10b-5,
and that it had violated section 17(a) of the 1933 Act." While it is possible that these claims would be tenable when a creditor had substantial
participation in a scheme of stock sales in order to finance repayment of
its debt, in this case there was no evidence that Deltec even had knowledge of the unregistered sales. At best, the proof established a basis for
concluding that Deltec should have surmised that the checks it was receiving might have been funded by the proceeds of unregistered sales.
As for legal holdings, the case is likely to be cited primarily for its effort to restate the tests for determining when a party is a seller for purposes of section 12 of the 1933 Act solely by virtue of his degree of participation in the transaction. Reviewing the "proximate cause" and
"substantial factor" tests announced in earlier cases, 8 ' the court in Pharo
concluded: "We read Hill York and Lewis as limiting sections 12(1) and
(2) sellers (i) to those in privity with the purchaser and (ii) to those whose
participation in the buy-sell transaction is a substantial factor in causing
the transaction to take place. '" The case also notes the dangers inherent
in broadening the "seller" concept beyond actual sellers, because of the
strict or near-strict liability standards of sections 12(1) and 12(2).1
Wolfson v. Baker" is a unique case that is more significant on a procedural point than as a securities case. It was brought by an individual who
had suffered a criminal conviction for failure to comply with the 1933 Act
registration provisions against a broker who allegedly had failed to advise
him of those obligations. The case was based upon rule 10b-5 and the
New York Stock Exchange's Rule 405," which is the so-called "know your
customer" rule. As a result of large sales of unregistered stock, Wolfson
had been convicted for registration violations, sentenced to a year in
87.

15 U.S.C. §§ 771(l),(2) (1976).

88. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1976).
89. Lewis v. Walston & Co., 487 F.2d 617 (5th Cir. 1973); Hill York Corp. v. American
Int'l Franchises, Inc., 448 F.2d 680 (5th Cir. 1971).
90. 621 F.2d at 667.
91. Id. at 665-66. The issue of whether a person is a "seller" is discussed in section III, at
text accompanying notes 28-44 supra.
92. 623 F.2d 1074 (5th Cir. 1980).
93. New York Stock Exchange Rule 405, printed in NEw YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC.
CONsTIrUTION AND Rums 1 2405 (CCH 1976).
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prison and fined $100,000, and had been the subject of various civil actions by purchasers of the securities. Seeking to recover for these considerable adverse events, he sued the broker and the brokerage firm alleging
that they had breached their duty to advise him of the registration requirements attaching to sales they had handled for him. The suit foundered on the doctrine of non-mutual collateral estoppel. Applying this
doctrine, the district court determined that the prior criminal conviction
constituted an adjudication, binding on Wolfson, that he had knowledge
of his registration obligations. The Fifth Circuit affirmed, after reviewing
both the collateral estoppel theory and cases, as well as the basis on
which the district court had concluded that the issue of Wolfson's knowledge had been thoroughly litigated in the criminal trial.
Based on the prior finding of Wolfson's knowledge, the district court
concluded that Wolfson could not recover either on an implied action
under New York Stock Exchange Rule 405 or under rule 10b-5. The Fifth
Circuit agreed. The in pari delicto doctrine precluded recovery under rule
405, even assuming (but not deciding) that the rule supported an implied
private cause of action. In addition, Wolfson's knowledge of his obligations precluded rule 10b-6" recovery for any otherwise culpable omissions
by the broker with respect to that subject.
The materiality issue arose in SEC v. Mize, 95 which concerned omissions from a press, release, registration statement, and tender offer materials of information concerning the proposed spin-off of a corporate subsidiary and a corporate officer's efforts to obtain control of the spun-off
entity. Several different proposed transactions were involved and their
details are too complex for presentation in this survey. The pertinent
point is that in each instance the allegedly material information concerned proposed transactions that did not come to fruition. In each instance, the district court concluded that the omitted information concerned "ideas," and was not on a level of probability making it material.
The Fifth Circuit concluded in one instance that, while the information
was of a nature that could have been held material, the district court did
not abuse its discretion in concluding that it was not. In the other instance, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the proposed course of action had
reached "a stage of probability rather than mere possibility,"" and that
the proposed transaction and related negotiations were required to be disclosed. The case merits reading by any lawyer faced with the problem of
adequate disclosures in the context of unsettled and developing events.
In Mize, the Fifth Circuit remanded to the district court for considera94.
95.
96.

17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-6 (1980).
615 F.2d 1046 (5th Cir. 1980).
Id. at 1055.
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tion of whether the entry of an injunction was appropriate. It noted that
proof of prior violations is not an adequate basis for an injunction, and
that the SEC must prove that there exists a reasonable likelihood that
violations will occur in the future.
VI.

PROCEDURE AND MISCELLANEOUS MATTERS

In the Mize case, the court stated the requirement that injunctions be
entered only upon a showing that future violations are likely. In SEC v.
Caterinicchia,1 the Fifth Circuit demonstrated a willingness to take this
requirement quite seriously. The defendant had the misfortune of acquiring control of an insolvent small loan company that had been actively
misrepresenting its financial condition to the purchasers of the notes
through which it largely financed its operations. During a period of approximately six months prior to filing a bankruptcy petition, the defendant continued to renew existing notes without ,disclosing the company's
precarious financial condition, despite SEC inquiries about the adequacy
of disclosures. Although there was little question that prior violations of
section 17(a) of the 1933 Act 6 had occurred, the district court denied
injunctive relief for failure to establish the likelihood of future violations.
The Fifth Circuit affirmed, characterizing the district court's decision as
having been based on the conclusion that the continued willful violations
of the antifraud provisions "resulted from a misguided attempt to protect
investors by saving the company from bankruptcy and liquidation. '" 9 The
Fifth Circuit found no abuse of discretion in this conclusion.
On the other hand, SEC v. Spence & Green Chemical Co.100 provides
an interesting contrast with Caterinicchia.In this case the injunction was
granted and was affirmed on appeal. The defendant repeatedly violated
the registration provisions of the 1933 Act, even after having a regulation
A 101 exemption formally suspended. Over a three-year period he had
hired an accountant and lawyer to prepare for an offering, had refused to
accept their conclusions that the company had serious undisclosed potential liabilities as a result of prior registration violations, had filed a regulation A offering notification containing a financial statement prepared by
an accountant who was also a director of the company, and had distributed that circular to some eight hundred existing stockholders in an effort
to secure further investments, even though the filing had been rejected by
the SEC for its numerous deficiencies. He also had made obvious out-of97. 613 F.2d 102 (5th Cir. 1980).
98. 15 U.S.C. § 771(1),(2) (1976).
99. 613 F.2d at 106.
100. 612 F.2d 896 (5th Cir. 1980).
101. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251-230.263 (1980).
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state offers even though purporting to rely on the intrastate exemption.
In affirming, the Fifth Circuit referred to the defendant's "continued
flouting of the federal securities laws and SEC procedures."' 10 ,
Spence & Green also contains a straightforward application of the law
concerning the private placement exemption, including the Fifth Circuit's
frequent reference to "the same disclosure as would be derived from registration"'' 0 and a sensible holding that the district court had erred in
finding a rule 10b-5 violation when there had been no sale based on the
particular alleged misrepresentation.e 4
OKC Corp. v. Williams' 5 presents one minor battle in an all-out procedural war between the SEC and OKC Corporation. Other district court
rulings and a pending appeal are cited in the decision. All have their genesis in a report prepared by an outside law firm at the request of a board
committee charged with investigating alleged mismanagement and improper use of corporate funds by the chief executive officer. Without authorization, several corporate employees passed copies of the report to
both the Department of Energy and the SEC. The case decided by the
Fifth Circuit involved the narrow question of whether there was any genuine issue of disputed fact concerning the level of the SEC's participation
in the alleged private-party taking of the report. Concluding that there
were no such issues, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of
summary judgment against OKC's claims that such participation precluded SEC use of the report.
Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. National Association
of Securities Dealers, Inc.'" is billed by the court as a "novel and important securities regulatory matter."'' 0 Perhaps so, but the case is of little
interest except to those practitioners who represent broker-dealers in administrative disciplinary procedures. In brief, the case involved the hearing of an administrative complaint by the National Association of Securities Dealers ("NASD") against Merrill Lynch. The complaint arose from
alleged churning of the account of an elderly, unsophisticated widow. Because the widow intended to sue for her losses, Merrill Lynch sought to
exclude her and her attorney from attendance at the administrative hearing. The NASD refused, and Merrill Lynch obtained an injunction
against the hearing from the district court. The Fifth Circuit reversed on

102. 612 F.2d at 903.
103. See text accompanying notes 45-55 supra.
104. 612 F.2d at 903. The court observed that while section 17(a) of the 1933 Act, 15
U.S.C. § 771(1),(2) (1976), applies to offers as well as sales, rule 10b-5 applies only to actual
sales and purchases. Id.
105. 614 F.2d 58, rehearing denied, 617 F.2d 1207 (5th Cir. 1980).
106. 616 F.2d 1363 (5th Cir. 1980).
107. Id. at 1365.
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the ground that exhaustion of administrative remedies should have been
required. In reaching this conclusion, it explored the self-regulatory concept incorporated in the 1934 Act, as well as the appeal procedures provided through the SEC and, ultimately, the courts. Characterizing the
ruling to which Merrill Lynch objected as a nonfinal procedural ruling,
the Fifth Circuit concluded that there was no showing of irreparable injury and no other basis, such as a "clear and unambiguous statutory or
constitutional violation,"' s on which to base an exception to the exhaustion doctrine. Although the Fifth Circuit's decision was grounded on procedural principles, it nonetheless also ruled that there was no merit to
Merrill Lynch's substantive claim that the NASD's rules provided the
right to a "confidential" hearing.'
Broad v. Rockwell InternationalCorp."0 will probably have its greatest
impact in the relatively narrow, arcane area of Trust Indenture Act"'
qualified indentures for publicly offered corporate debt obligations. Although the typical trust indenture contains dozens of pages of complex,
highly-standardized provisions based on the ALI-ABA Model Indenture,
there is very little litigation construing indenture language. Rockwell addresses the topical issue of the effect on conversion rights of a cash
merger in which the issuer of the debentures-and of the stock into which
they are convertible-is eliminated. After some disputes among the various attorneys, the acquiring corporation, Rockwell, and the indenture
trustee for the debentures had concluded that proper application of the
indenture resulted in the conversion privilege becoming a privilege to receive only the amount of cash received in the merger for each share of
stock into which the debenture could be converted. The conversion price
was $72.50 but the cash consideration in the merger to holders of the
stock was $25 per share. Thus, as a result of the merger, the right to
participate in potential appreciation of the stock above $72.50 was eliminated and replaced by a right to convert each $1,000 principal amount of
debentures into $344.75 cash. Of course, the acquiring corporation was
liable for principal repayment and interest on the debentures, a matter
that was not in dispute.
The district court concluded that the indenture was not ambiguous and
that as a matter of law the construction adopted by Rockwell and the
indenture trustee was correct. Thus, it dismissed plaintiffs' contract
claims based on the indenture. However, the Fifth Circuit stressed the
importance of the appreciation potential to the purchasers of convertible
debentures and, after reviewing various provisions of the indenture, con108.
109.
110.
111.

Id. at 1370-71.
Id. at 1368-69.
614 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1980).
Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa-77bbb (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
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cluded that the indenture was ambiguous and that the directed verdict
was inappropriate. Accordingly, it remanded for submission to the jury of
a complicated question of contractual interpretation having importance
far beyond the parameters of the particular case. One would anticipate
that appropriate clarification of the Model Indenture will soon be
considered.
The court also addressed the question of whether the issuer and indenture trustee had, under the indenture, a contractual implied covenant of
fair dealing. The Fifth Circuit again concluded that the question was ambiguous (one wonders whether any contract can be anything but ambiguous with respect to an asserted implied convenant) and that this question
should also be submitted to the jury.
Beyond the contract itself, the plaintiffs had asserted that the issuer
and the indenture trustee had violated fiduciary obligations imposed by
common law principles. With respect to the issuer, the court concluded
that full compliance with the contractual duties, including any contractual implied duty of fair dealing, would preclude a finding of breach of
fiduciary duty. On the other hand, if the issuer had breached the contract, and there was also a showing of bad faith, fraud, or unfair conduct,
then a breach of fiduciary duty would also have been established. With
respect to the indenture trustee, the court concluded that the Trust Indenture Act did not impose a fiduciary obligation. On the other hand, it
did not prohibit the imposition of state fiduciary duties on indenture
trustees. Based on several rather old New York and Second Circuit cases,
the Fifth Circuit concluded that under New York law, which governed the
indenture, an indenture trustee does have a fiduciary duty beyond its
bare duties under the indenture and the Trust Indenture Act.
In their complaint, the plaintiffs sought reinstatement of their common
stock conversion privilege. It is not clear from the reported case how they
proposed to translate a right to acquire shares of the original issuer at a
specified price into a right to acquire shares of a quite different issuer.
The district court concluded that this remedy would not be appropriate,
and the Fifth Circuit agreed. Rather, the express default provisions of the
indenture and money damages were held to provide adequate remedies. It
should be noted that the remedy for default under the indenture was acceleration of principal indebtedness, a not insubstantial remedy for a $40
million principal amount of debentures due January 1, 1987 and until
that time bearing interest at 4 7/ %.
Rockwell also dealt with several significant rule 10b-5 issues. The first
concerned the "forced seller" doctrine. Plaintiff sought to establish that a
"sale" had occurred for rule 10b-5 purposes when Rockwell and the indenture trustee executed a supplemental indenture incorporating their
understanding that the conversion privilege would thereafter be exercisable only for cash. The Fifth Circuit reviewed numerous cases and con-
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cluded that there was no sale in these circumstances. Rather, it viewed
the act of entering into the supplemental indenture as primarily a potential violation of the indenture and of state fiduciary law, not as a transaction subject to the federal securities laws.
The plaintiffs had also contended that rule 10b-5 was violated by the
failure of the original issuer to disclose at the time the debentures were
issued that the conversion privilege could be converted by virtue of a cash
merger into a privilege to convert only for cash. Clearly there had been a
sale at that time. However, the claim foundered for lack of scienter.
While concluding that recklessness was sufficient to meet the
Hochfelder112 scienter requirement, the court concluded that, at worst,
the original issuer was negligent in failing to anticipate the possibility of a
cash merger (which at that time was not permitted by the law of the state
in which the original issuer was organized), and that this failure certainly
did not approach recklessness. The court stated: "We are reluctant to
hold that debenture issuers must, under threat of 10b-5 penalty, explicitly anticipate every circumstance possible--even a change of those which
are currently illegal-involving the issuers and the debenture."'1 This
holding will be of some comfort for practitioners confronted with the
preparation of disclosure documents for complicated financial instruments that, over extended periods of time, could be affected by a large
array of changing circumstances, laws and practices.

112. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976). The scienter requirement is discussed at text accompanying note 12 and notes 77-82 supra.
113. 614 F.2d at 441.

